By Bret Stephens
How might the United States capitalize on the significant yet challenging strategic opportunity presented by the collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime in Damascus? Primarily by employing a mix of substantial incentives for, and credible threats against, our adversaries, frenemy entities, allies, and potential allies. Let’s examine the details.
— Syria: A critical query regarding our approach to Syria pertains to the sincerity of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the rebel faction primarily accountable for dismantling the Assad administration, in its disavowal of terrorism and Taliban-like Islamism. The Biden administration could express goodwill by rescinding the State Department’s $10 million bounty on Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the HTS leader.
However, sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Syria and HTS’ classification as a terrorist entity should be lifted only under specific conditions. Will the new rulers of Syria ensure freedom of worship for religious minorities and dress for women? Will they acknowledge the de facto independence of Syria’s Kurdish population? Will they collaborate with international initiatives to eradicate the Islamic State group? Should HTS genuinely seek to establish a different rapport with Washington, it could also call for Russia’s military exit from Syria, reminiscent of Anwar Sadat’s demands in the 1970s.
— Lebanon: “If we lose Syria, then we will no longer have Hezbollah.” This forecast concerning the terrorist group was made by Soheil Karimi, an Iranian hardliner. Already weakened by Israel, Hezbollah will find it difficult to maintain its position as Lebanon’s leading political force without a straightforward supply line for rearmament. It benefits Israel, the United States, and the Lebanese population to see an end to Hezbollah’s decades-long reign of devastation.
How? The foundation for action lies in the full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which stipulates that “there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.” Hezbollah has openly ignored this demand for 18 years. Donald Trump could aid in enforcing this resolution by announcing via social media that he will not acknowledge Israel as obligated to uphold its ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah until the group completely disarms.
Ultimately, Hezbollah should face a decisive choice: Engage in Lebanese politics as a conventional political party adhering to established rules or confront additional military defeat from the Zionist foe.
— Iran: The Islamic Republic is currently enriching uranium to levels near weapons-grade. Mirroring President Joe Biden’s stern warnings to Hezbollah after October 7, his stance toward Iran should be clear: Don’t.
Regarding a future Trump administration, it should present Iran with an ultimatum — and an audacious proposition. The ultimatum could be articulated in the informal language characteristic of Trump: “IF IRAN’S MALICIOUS LEADERS PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE WILL HUNT THEM DOWN!” This implies that the regime would jeopardize its own survival if it rushes toward acquiring a bomb. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, who is recovering from multiple setbacks, will understand the implication.
The audacious proposal is equally straightforward: Trump should advocate for what I have termed “normalization for normalization” as a framework for enhancing relations with Iran. In essence, the U.S. would offer Iran complete normalization of ties, encompassing the lifting of economic sanctions and embassy reopenings, in return for the normalization of Iranian foreign policy: an absolute halt to its backing of regional terrorist proxies such as the Houthis and Hamas, along with an irreversible and verifiable termination of Iran’s nuclear endeavors. Khamenei may outright reject this proposition since hostility toward America is foundational to the ideology of the Islamic Republic, but it would provide the people of Iran with a goal to strive for as they draw inspiration from last week’s upheaval in Damascus.
— The Gaza Strip: Earlier in September, I expressed disagreement with a potential hostage agreement between Israel and Hamas. Part of my rationale was that Israel could not afford to appear defeated, at least in the eyes of its adversaries. Following the defeats of Hamas’ Yahya Sinwar and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, the devastating incursions, the dismantling of much of Hezbollah’s arsenal, and the overthrow of Assad, circumstances have shifted.
With Israel now undisputedly emerging from the conflict as a victor, it must secure the return of its hostages. Let Hamas attempt to govern amid the ruins it has created.
This does not imply that Israel should concede to a weak transaction. Primarily, agreeing to a phased return of the hostages would be a strategic error, as it would incentivize Hamas to escalate demands for each subsequent hostage. Trump could significantly assist in this matter by advising Hamas’ sponsors in Qatar that the United States would revoke Qatar’s designation as a major non-NATO ally and relocate the Al-Udeid air base — the forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command — to the United Arab Emirates unless all hostages are freed by January 20. Let the manipulative Qataris figure out the rest.
Other stakeholders? Washington must deter the Turks from exploiting Syria’s upheaval as an occasion to settle scores with the Kurds. This particularly involves maintaining our troop presence in eastern Syria. Additionally, the Saudis must exhibit regional leadership by aiding in Syria’s reconstruction and resuming diplomatic normalization talks with Israel.
None of this will be easy or uncomplicated. However, the conclusion of Assad’s oppressive rule opens numerous possibilities.
