By Anton Troianovski
On Tuesday, President Vladimir Putin raised Russia’s nuclear weapon usage threshold, a previously planned maneuver with its timing seemingly reflecting the Kremlin’s intent to showcase its aggressive stance in response to Ukrainian attacks within Russian borders using American missiles.
The decree signed by Putin introduced an updated version of Russia’s nuclear policy, which he previously detailed in a televised address in September. However, its timing was significant, following just two days after President Joe Biden authorized the use of U.S.-supplied long-range missiles by Ukraine for attacks on Russian soil.
When inquired if Russia might employ nuclear weapons in retaliation for such strikes, Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesperson, reiterated the new doctrine’s statement that Russia “reserves the right” to deploy such weapons in reaction to any conventional-weapons assault constituting a “critical threat” to its “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Subsequently, Russia’s Ministry of Defense revealed that Ukraine had employed the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, in a dawn assault on a munitions depot in southwestern Russia. A senior U.S. official and a senior Ukrainian official, both granting anonymity to discuss the ongoing actions, confirmed that ATACMS, capable of reaching 190 miles, the farthest range of any armaments provided by the West to Ukraine, were used in the strikes.
The White House downplayed Putin’s new policy. In a statement from the National Security Council, it indicated that it had noted “no alterations to Russia’s nuclear posture.”
The newly released doctrine, published on the Kremlin’s website Tuesday, differs from the previous version in at least two significant aspects, showcasing how Putin intends to leverage the threat of nuclear capabilities to dissuade the United States from increasing support for Ukraine.
Firstly, it introduces the possibility of utilizing nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed nation that does not directly attack Russia but supports assaults by a nonnuclear nation. This clearly references Ukraine and its nuclear-capable allies led by the United States. The prior nuclear doctrine focused on retaliating against assaults by nuclear-armed nations and coalitions.
Secondly, it lowers the threshold for Russia to contemplate nuclear usage in response to conventional weapon assaults. The former doctrine, published in 2020, specified that such an attack must endanger “the very existence of the state,” whereas the new doctrine sets this benchmark at a “critical threat” to Russia’s sovereignty.
The publication of the doctrine Tuesday seemed to further indicate from the Kremlin that Russia might utilize nuclear weapons in response to Ukrainian attacks supported by the U.S., with potential retaliation aimed at both U.S. facilities and Ukraine itself.
“Aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any nonnuclear nation with the collaboration or backing of a nuclear nation is regarded as a joint attack,” the document states.
During his daily conference call with reporters, Peskov highlighted this particular section of the amended doctrine, noting, “this is also a very important paragraph.”
“Nuclear deterrence is focused on ensuring that a potential adversary realizes the certainty of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies,” Peskov stated.
In the National Security Council’s statement, the White House mentioned it was “not surprised” by the new decree as Putin had indicated the change months prior.
“This is more of the same irresponsible rhetoric from Russia, which we have observed over the past two years,” the statement declared. The White House made no connection between its easing of restrictions on Ukraine and Putin’s announcement.
Western officials have previously expressed that they would be most concerned about Moscow potentially using nuclear weapons if the Russian military finds itself in a precarious position, and currently, the conflict in Ukraine seems to be favoring Putin.
On the frontlines, Russian forces are pushing forward in eastern Ukraine, while Ukraine faces challenges with recruitment and morale. Geopolitically, Putin has also been making strides: His conversation last week with Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz ended two years of diplomatic isolation by the major Western powers, while the upcoming election of Donald Trump as U.S. president has sparked optimism in Russia regarding a potential peace agreement in Ukraine on the Kremlin’s terms.
Since the onset of his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin has leveraged the threat of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal to deter Western military assistance to Ukraine. Despite this strategy, he has achieved only limited success, with the United States spearheading a coalition that has sent tens of billions of dollars’ worth of advanced tanks, artillery systems, and missiles.
However, Putin has aimed to establish a new red line regarding Ukraine’s use of Western missiles for deep strikes within Russian territory. To the discontent of Ukrainian officials, Biden had previously resisted allowing such weapons to be used in this manner, citing concerns of a severe response from Putin and the limited battlefield impact of these missiles.
Yet, U.S. officials noted that Biden recently altered his stance following Russia’s unexpected decision to involve North Korean troops in the conflict.
In September, Putin cautioned that if the United States and its allies allowed Ukraine to fire missiles further into Russia, it would place his country “at war” with NATO. Ukraine has employed domestically developed weapons to conduct longer-range strikes.
Leading up to Biden’s decision, some U.S. officials expressed concerns that Ukraine’s missile usage across the border might provoke Putin to retaliate with force against the United States and its coalition allies. Other U.S. officials believed such fears were exaggerated.
