By Patricia Mazzei
Florida’s status as a key battleground in presidential elections has faded. Candidates no longer make frequent visits during the campaign season. Voters are no longer inundated with their advertisements. Additionally, there’s barely a hint of uncertainty about the state’s Republican leanings.
In earlier presidential elections, Florida’s outcomes were often determined by razor-thin margins — none narrower than the 537 votes that awarded George W. Bush the presidency after a notorious recount in 2000. Throughout the following two decades, fierce competition unfolded as Florida, boasting a wealth of electoral votes, evolved into the largest swing state.
Over the last four years, the Florida Democratic Party has diminished and faced difficulties in revitalization. Democrats have seen a decline in their registered voter counts and now trail by over 1 million registered Republicans. They haven’t secured a statewide office since 2018, and national fundraising has nearly evaporated.
The loss of Florida as an electoral vote stronghold poses significant challenges for Democrats as they strive for every possible vote across seven competitive states in the upcoming 2024 presidential election.
Some causes are structural and long-standing: demographics, partisan gerrymandering, and legislative term limits. Others stem from decisions made by Democrats themselves: reluctance to sufficiently invest in the essential elements of election victories; fragmented fundraising efforts; and misguided beliefs regarding the rising Hispanic electorate, according to a review of voter registration data, campaign expenditures, and numerous interviews with political operatives from both parties.
The outcomes in November and in upcoming election cycles in Florida will serve as a barometer for the nation’s political landscape, especially as more individuals relocate to Sun Belt states, increasing their electoral votes. For Democrats to win the presidency, they must establish substantial footholds in these regions.
“Florida’s narrative extends beyond just the state itself,” remarked Raymond Paultre, executive director of the Alliance, a coalition of Democratic contributors in Florida. “It represents the struggles of a progressive movement trying to gain traction in the South, competing for the support of younger voters of color, and striving to appeal to younger males.”
The weaknesses in Florida became clear in 2020 when national Democrats largely withdrew financial support from the state.
In the two preceding years, Democrats ran a moderate incumbent, Bill Nelson, for the Senate, alongside a progressive candidate, Andrew Gillum, for governor, attempting to cover all political bases, but both lost following recounts. Nelson was defeated by Republican Sen. Rick Scott, who has leveraged his considerable wealth to secure three statewide elections by margins of 1 percentage point or less.
Florida has increasingly appeared insurmountable for Democrats.
While Democrats faltered, Republicans capitalized on chances to reshape Florida’s electorate in their favor. A wave of conservative policies has emerged, solidifying the state’s position as a bastion of Republican power.
These developments have compelled Democrats to attempt to reconstruct their routes to electoral victory, as Florida has slipped from their grasp.
In 2020, Joe Biden won the presidency, but the state favored former President Donald Trump, ending a streak in which Floridians consistently voted for the winning candidate since 1996. Trump’s narrow victory in Florida that year, by just over 3 percentage points, marked the most significant presidential margin in the state since 2004.
Current polls indicate that Trump holds an average lead of 7 points over Vice President Kamala Harris in Florida.
Governor Ron DeSantis, a Republican elected in 2018 by less than half a percentage point, claims credit for Florida’s transformation, despite the years it took to achieve. He secured reelection in 2022 by over 19 points, a sweeping victory that he hoped would propel his presidential ambitions and dispel any notions of imminent Democrat competitiveness.
“For the entirety of this century, presidential elections had us on edge regarding Florida,” DeSantis mentioned to Republicans at a state party dinner last month. Now, he remarked, securing a win is “a layup.”
Organizational missteps
Democrats characterize Florida’s political shift as a gradual process that suddenly accelerated.
In 2012, the last time a Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama, triumphed in Florida, Democrats outnumbered Republicans by nearly 1.5 million voters. Since then, every one of the state’s 67 counties has shifted toward the Republican side.
By 2020, Democrats’ registration advantage dwindled to about 97,000 voters. As of September 1, with approximately 16.1 million total voters in the state, there are about 1 million more “active” registered Republicans than Democrats. The state has disproportionately classified more Democrats as “inactive” voters, explained Daniel A. Smith, an elections expert at the University of Florida. Voters are designated as inactive if they haven’t voted, requested a mail ballot, or updated their registration in two general elections.
Some new Republicans are switchers — long-time registered Democrats who likely leaned Republican for years — a trend observed across the South. Others relocated to Florida as part of a migration that began earlier but escalated during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Nonetheless, political parties and their leaders also contributed to the situation.
The Republican Party of Florida is one of the best-funded state parties in the country, thanks to 25 years of Republican control in state governance. Importantly, the party runs its own voter registration initiative.
The Democrats have not claimed a gubernatorial victory in Florida since 1994. Republicans control the drawing of legislative districts and possess supermajorities in both the state House and Senate.
With limited power, the Florida Democratic Party increasingly delegated voter registration efforts over the past decade to nonprofit organizations. This decentralization aimed to establish a sustainable progressive framework, but despite raising millions, outside organizations fell short in registering a significant number of voters. New state regulations further complicated their efforts.
The decentralization also led to divides in fundraising. Following Obama’s success in Florida, a group of Democratic donors sought greater control over their expenditures. They emulated a successful model from Colorado, forming the Alliance, which redirected resources to progressive initiatives instead of the party itself.
This shift undermined a state party that, lacking a governor to drive fundraising efforts, became heavily reliant on individual donors, according to Democratic strategist Steve Schale.
Strategic miscalculations
Florida Democrats assumed that their coalition would expand as the state’s Hispanic population grew, a long-held belief shared in several states. In 2012, approximately 14% of registered voters in Florida identified as Hispanic; this year, over 18% do.
Florida Republicans prioritized Hispanic outreach beginning in the 1980s, with Jeb Bush taking the lead as the party chair in Miami-Dade County before later serving two terms as governor. Consequently, Florida’s Hispanic voters, initially predominantly Cuban American, generally voted Republican. As older Cuban exiles passed away, Democrats expected younger generations to shift Democratic, a hypothesis bolstered by Obama’s victories.
In 2016, Hillary Clinton captured about 62% of Hispanic voters in Florida yet still lost the state. While her campaign effectively mobilized minority voters, it failed to mitigate losses in predominantly white counties, a feat achieved by Obama.
Florida’s expanding suburbs and exurbs, particularly in the Tampa media market, leaned increasingly Republican. Trump attracted numerous voters — especially older white individuals and those lacking college degrees — in a state with a high number of retirees and service industry workers.
Democrats faced challenges in Tampa, and soon, they would encounter difficulties in Miami.
Hispanics constitute approximately 68% of Miami-Dade County’s population. While Clinton won the county, the most populated in Florida, by a margin of 30 percentage points, Biden’s victory was reduced to just 7 points four years later.
From 2016 to 2020, Republicans actively wooed Hispanic voters in Florida. Trump severed the ties Obama established with Cuba’s Communist regime. As governor, Scott learned some Spanish and provided aid to Puerto Ricans after Hurricane Maria. Senator Marco Rubio — a Cuban American fluent in Spanish — succeeded in securing sanctions against the Venezuelan government.
Working-class Hispanics faced hardships during the pandemic. Protests over police violence highlighted divisions between Hispanics and progressive factions. It revealed that Trumpism resonated with this demographic more broadly, including many who had previously voted Democratic.
By 2020, younger Cuban Americans began to vote in patterns similar to their grandparents. An influx of newcomers, who witnessed limited improvements in their living conditions during the Obama administration, leaned toward Trump.
Can Democrats rebuild?
It’s possible that the 2022 midterms marked the nadir for Florida Democrats. Their gubernatorial candidate, Charlie Crist, a former Republican, failed to evoke enthusiasm. Minimal national funds came in, and turnout plummeted: approximately 600,000 fewer Democrats participated compared to 2018.
This year, Nikki Fried, the state party chair, portrayed Florida as still competitive. However, operatives recognize that their potential victories, if they occur, may be modest: boosting turnout, securing some legislative seats, and keeping the presidential and Senate races within single-digit margins.
“We’re not going to transition from a 20-point defeat in 2022 to ‘Everything is fine,’” stated Beth Matuga, a Democratic consultant managing state House campaigns.
