By Bret Stephens
The most captivating aspect of the hostage and ceasefire arrangement that Israeli and Hamas representatives reached on Wednesday doesn’t lie in its stipulations, which mainly echo proposals put forth for months, nor in the fact that Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, is essentially conceding to Hamas’ persistent authority over the Gaza Strip after adamantly asserting he wouldn’t.
It’s the manner in which the agreement was obtained: by Steven Witkoff, Donald Trump’s affluent associate and incoming Mideast envoy, during a candid encounter with the prime minister on a Saturday morning. “The envoy communicated to his host unequivocally that Trump anticipated him to agree to a deal,” reported Amos Harel, a military analyst for Haaretz, on Tuesday. “Issues that Netanyahu had labeled as life-and-death concerns,” he noted, “suddenly disappeared.”
Harel refers to this as “the Trump effect.” What does it entail? Partly it’s the reservoir of political capital that every incoming president possesses before taking office and how it’s subsequently utilized (or wasted); partly it’s the fact that Trump is acting as though he’s already in charge. But primarily, it’s the anxiety and eagerness to comply that Trump inspires, particularly among those vying for his approval.
The outcome, in the hostage situation, reveals an overlooked diplomatic conundrum: Thanks largely to Trump, an agreement favored by the Israeli left and criticized by the right is set to take effect. A year’s diplomacy under the Biden administration is finally poised to yield results due to its political adversary. The far-right factions within Netanyahu’s coalition could exit the government. Additionally, Netanyahu appears much more amenable to yielding to Washington than he was during the tenure of Democrats in the White House.
In the hostage arrangement, the toll for Israel will, in many respects, be substantial. For each Israeli hostage liberated by Hamas, Israel will release multiple Palestinian prisoners, many of whom have Israeli blood on their hands. It was through such a release that Yahya Sinwar — the architect of the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre — was let go. The phased approach of the accord — which starts with the release of 33 hostages, most of whom are alive but some likely deceased — will leave an uncertain number behind, elevating their political significance and granting Hamas the chance to gain further concessions.
More critically, if Israel withdraws from the Philadelphi Corridor, the strip of territory separating Gaza from Egypt, Hamas might be able to substantially rearm, heightening the likelihood of a repeat of the events of Oct. 7 and their aftermath, although it is not guaranteed.
This does not imply that the agreement is detrimental to Israel’s national interest — not to mention the blessing it represents for the returning hostages, their families, and a populace that views the liberation of captives as a paramount moral obligation.
In contrast to May, when President Joe Biden first proposed this agreement (or early September, when I opposed it), Israel now finds itself significantly stronger strategically. The Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance,” to which Hamas belongs, has been devastated in Lebanon, ousted in Syria, obliterated in Gaza, and seriously impacted in Iran itself. Regardless of the number of Palestinian prisoners released, no one in Hamas can genuinely claim that their Oct. 7 gamble yielded them anything but disaster. Israel also faces less concern, with Trump as president, regarding international arms embargoes or legal repercussions: Observe how the threats of arresting Netanyahu in European cities quickly dissipate.
A more complex dilemma for the Israeli right is what further concessions Trump might expect from them. The president-elect evidently desires an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement as a culmination to the Abraham Accords he facilitated in 2020. For that to materialize, the Saudis will request a blueprint for a Palestinian state. Trump might also wish to leverage Iran’s current vulnerability to negotiate a second nuclear agreement, whereas Netanyahu’s primary focus is on securing American assistance for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, potentially in the upcoming weeks or months.
Where prudent choices lie in either scenario largely hinges on the specifics. (I would endorse nearly any viable deal with Saudi Arabia while opposing almost any probable one with Iran.) However, the broader message is this: Trump will disrupt conventional foreign-policy beliefs, whether from the left or the right. Liberals who believe Trump’s second term will be marked by unchecked aggression may find themselves astonished. Conservatives who anticipate it will bring overdue firmness against our adversaries may feel disillusioned.
Trump may possess the demeanor of a bully, yet he also embodies the instincts of a negotiator — alongside a desire for recognition, such as the Nobel Peace Prize he believes he was denied for the Abraham Accords. Regardless of what his next four years in office entail, it will not adhere to an ideological mold. Somewhere out there, the essence of Richard Nixon may be smiling.
