By David French
Military setbacks are significant. Israel’s inexcusable negligence on October 7, 2023, permitted Hamas, a militant group with only a fraction of the military capacity of the Israel Defense Forces, to inflict more casualties on Israeli civilians than the combined forces of Egypt and Syria during the peak of the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973.
However, recent events, such as Israel’s remarkable airstrike on Friday targeting Hezbollah’s underground command center near Beirut, which resulted in the death of the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, indicate a shift in the balance of power against Israel’s adversaries since October 7. Hamas is on the decline. Hezbollah is suffering losses. More crucially: Iran, by consequence, is also faltering. Should these setbacks persist, Iran will emerge from this conflict as a weakened entity, less able to threaten Israel and seen as less formidable by its regional competitors.
Acknowledging that Iran and its proxies have encountered battlefield defeats does not diminish the severe toll on Israel. Areas in the north have experienced depopulation due to Hezbollah’s rocket attacks. Israel faces widespread international condemnation for its violent response to Hamas. Additionally, there are evident internal pressures affecting the nation and its military. Even if Israel prevails in this war, it will have endured a horrific toll.
However, my own military experience in Iraq has shown me that public perception frequently lags behind the realities on the ground. A natural emphasis on politics and diplomacy can shift focus away from the battlefield — and the current battlefield conditions tell a different story compared to the start of this conflict. Israel’s enemies have committed serious blunders and sustained significant losses. These military failures may indeed have more lasting ramifications for them than for Israel itself.
Hamas, heavily supported militarily and financially by Iran, has been severely weakened as a combatant. Exact casualty figures are hard to ascertain, but they are considerable. By late last month, Israel reported eliminating as many as 17,000 Hamas fighters and “dismantling” 22 of its 24 battalions, while its own military losses were under 1,000 soldiers over nearly a year of conflict.
Hamas has not been vanquished, and some indications suggest that certain battalions are striving to replenish their ranks. Yet, the extent of the damage to the organization is undeniable, and Hamas has struggled to inflict significant casualties on the Israeli military.
I echo the concerns of my colleague Thomas Friedman that Israel may face an insurgency following the defeat of Hamas’ military components. Nevertheless, the current reality is unmistakable: Hamas exists in a much-reduced capacity.
Hezbollah retains a substantial fighting capability in Lebanon; however, Israel’s strike against Nasrallah is just one in a series of heavy hits against Iran’s most powerful proxy army.
On September 17, Israel reportedly executed an operation where thousands of pagers exploded in the hands and pockets of Hezbollah members. The next day, Israel allegedly triggered the detonation of handheld radios utilized by Hezbollah for communication, followed by a significant airstrike targeting a meeting of Hezbollah leaders, resulting in the deaths of numerous high-ranking officials.
Then, on September 23, Israel executed a barrage of strikes on what it identified as Hezbollah positions, which killed over 500 individuals. Israel asserted that these strikessignificantly damaged or obliterated thousands of Hezbollah rockets and missiles, with Hezbollah’s counteractions proving ineffective.
And what about Iran? It has endured a series of defeats and embarrassments. In April, Israel bombed an Iranian Embassy compound in Damascus, Syria, resulting in the deaths of three senior Iranian officers. When Iran retaliated with an assault comprising over 300 drones and ballistic missiles directed at Israel, most were intercepted by Israel and its allies. The resultant damage was minimal. Israel then conducted a follow-up attack that smoothly bypassed Iranian air defenses.
The message was unmistakable: Israel can strike Iran directly, whereas Iran struggles to hit Israel.
The humiliations for Iran continued. In July, Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas political bureau, reportedly by sneaking a bomb into a Revolutionary Guard guesthouse in Tehran, marking a stunning breach of Iranian security.
Israel has not eradicated its enemies. Hamas is weakened but remains operational. Hezbollah is said to still possess tens of thousands of missiles and rockets, posing a continual threat to northern Israel. Moreover, Iran maintains a vast missile arsenal and continues to wield influence over proxy forces throughout the Middle East. The tides of war can certainly shift once again.
Additionally, one could certainly argue that Iran and its proxies have achieved various nonmilitary objectives in their struggle against Israel. Israel’s diplomatic momentum in the Middle East appears to have subsided. Its anticipated rapprochement with Saudi Arabia is currently paused. Moreover, Israel seems to be facing increased isolation on the global stage.
However, consider how Israel’s military position has strengthened since October 7. Prior to the conflict, it faced essentially two loaded weapons at its borders: Hamas and Hezbollah. Now, one of those forces is largely decimated, and the other has lost numerous senior leaders along with many of its rockets, missiles, and launchers.
Furthermore, I question whether Iran’s nonmilitary achievements are as substantial as they might appear. Given the animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is overly optimistic to assert that October 7 truly extinguished (rather than postponed) a potential Israeli-Saudi diplomatic breakthrough. Additionally, one ponders how isolated Israel truly is when its allies and neighboring countries — including not just the United States, but also Britain and reportedly Jordan — supported Israel’s defense against Iranian aggression.
Undoubtedly, the Biden administration has been critically vocal towards Israel on multiple occasions, yet its actions reveal minimal divergence between the two nations — particularly regarding their approach to Iran.
In August, the Biden administration approved a $20 billion arms agreement with Israel, enabling it to procure 50 new F-15IA fighter jets from the United States (ensuring its qualitative military edge for the foreseeable future). Currently, there is also a significant increase in American naval presence in the region. The American Navy is confronting Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in the Red Sea and working to deter Iran from launching renewed offensives against Israel.
During my deployment, I learned an invaluable lesson regarding the West’s jihadist adversaries: Defeats demoralize them. While their resistance may not collapse entirely, the momentum of jihadism fluctuates based on its successes on the battlefield.
When the United States turned the tide during the surge in Iraq back in 2007 and 2008, al-Qaida in Iraq faced significant difficulties in replenishing its ranks, ultimately dwindling to a fraction of its previous power. By the conclusion of my deployment in 2008, there were al-Qaida militants who willingly surrendered to our troops in the field. (One al-Qaida commander even walked to the gate of our fortification and turned himself in.) Subsequently, fewer individuals flocked to the banner of the Islamic State group after its caliphate was dismantled in 2017. Following Hezbollah’s brutal 2006 confrontation with Israel, Nasrallah even expressed regret over the kidnappings that ignited the war.
While military victories don’t always guarantee lasting peace, they can safeguard societies. For example, South Korea prospers despite a long-standing stalemate with North Korea. A military defense has kept Taiwan autonomous. Israel’s triumphs haven’t culminated in enduring peace, but they have preserved the nation and facilitated its remarkable success.
I feel a profound sense of solemnity when individuals I respect lament the state of Israeli society (particularly its settler movement in the West Bank) and the dysfunction in its political system. I mourn the enormous loss of innocent lives. Yet, one year following what may have been Israel’s most severe military setback, its military accomplishments are ensuring that Israel, not Iran, continues to steer its own destiny.
