By Roger Cohen
Throughout nearly a year of conflict in the Middle East, the major powers have demonstrated an inability to halt or even meaningfully impact the skirmishes, a shortcoming that mirrors a chaotic landscape of decentralized authority that appears poised to persist.
On-again, off-again talks between Israel and Hamas aimed at ceasing the hostilities in the Gaza Strip, motivated by the United States, have repeatedly been touted by the Biden administration as nearing a breakthrough, only to ultimately falter. The latest Western-led effort to prevent an all-out Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon seems to be a frantic bid to evade catastrophe. Its chances of success appear highly questionable following the Israeli assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the long-serving head of Hezbollah, on Friday.
“In a world where the forces pulling apart are significantly stronger than those drawing together, there’s more power in more hands,” stated Richard Haass, the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The Middle East serves as the primary example of this perilous fragmentation.”
The death of Nasrallah, who led Hezbollah for over thirty years and transformed the Shiite group into one of the most potent nonstate military forces globally, creates a void that Hezbollah is likely to take considerable time to fill. This represents a significant setback for Iran, Hezbollah’s main supporter, and could potentially destabilize the Islamic Republic. The likelihood of an all-out war erupting in Lebanon remains uncertain.
“Nasrallah embodied everything for Hezbollah, and Hezbollah was the frontline of Iran,” noted Gilles Kepel, a prominent French analyst specializing in the Middle East and author of a book on global upheaval since October 7. “The Islamic Republic is now weakened, potentially fatally, and one wonders who can even command Hezbollah at this point.”
For many years, the United States stood as the sole nation capable of exerting constructive pressure on both Israel and Arab nations. It orchestrated the 1978 Camp David Accords that established peace between Israel and Egypt, alongside the Israel-Jordan peace agreement of 1994. Just over thirty years ago, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, shook hands on the White House lawn symbolizing peace, only for the fragile hope stemming from that moment to steadily deteriorate.
Since then, the global landscape, along with Israel’s primary adversaries, has transformed. America’s ability to influence Iran, its perennial adversary, and Iran’s proxies like Hezbollah, has diminished. Designated as terrorist organizations in Washington, Hamas and Hezbollah largely operate beyond the reach of American diplomatic efforts.
While the United States maintains enduring leverage over Israel, particularly through military aid, which includes a $15 billion package signed this year by President Joe Biden, the steadfast alliance with Israel, built on strategic, domestic, and shared democratic values, ensures that Washington is almost certainly never going to threaten to stop — let alone cut — the flow of arms.
Israel’s significant military reaction in Gaza following the Hamas attack on October 7, which led to the deaths of many Israelis and the taking of approximately 250 hostages, has prompted mild criticisms from Biden, who has called Israel’s response “over the top,” for instance. Nevertheless, American support for its beleaguered ally has remained resolute, even as Palestinian casualties in Gaza have soared into the tens of thousands, many of whom are civilians.
Under any conceivable presidency, the United States is not poised to abandon a Jewish state whose existence has faced increasing scrutiny over the past year, from American university campuses to the very streets of Europe, where the annihilation of the Jewish population occurred less than a century ago.
“If U.S. policy regarding Israel were to change, it would only be slightly,” remarked Haass, despite the growing sympathy, especially among younger Americans, for the Palestinian cause.
Other international powers have largely observed as the bloodshed has escalated. China, a significant importer of Iranian oil and a staunch supporter of any developments that may weaken the U.S.-led world order established post-1945, shows minimal interest in becoming a mediator for peace.
Russia appears to have little desire to assist, particularly with the upcoming U.S. election on November 5. Dependent on Iran for defense technology and drones amid its challenging war in Ukraine, it too is eager for any indications of American decline or opportunities to entangle the U.S. in Middle Eastern complexities.
Based on previous patterns, the potential return of former President Donald Trump to the White House is likely viewed in Moscow as the return of a leader who would be amenable to President Vladimir Putin.
Among regional powers, none possesses the strength or commitment to the Palestinian cause necessary to militarily confront Israel. Ultimately, Iran is cautious, aware that an all-out war could lead to the end of the Islamic Republic; Egypt is apprehensive about a massive influx of Palestinian refugees; and Saudi Arabia desires a Palestinian state but would not risk Saudi lives for that objective.
Concerning Qatar, it has financed Hamas with hundreds of millions annually, contributing to the construction of a convoluted network of tunnels, some extending down to 250 feet, where Israeli captives have been held. It has enjoyed the support of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who viewed Hamas as an effective tool to undermine the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, thereby derailing any possibilities for peace.
The tragedy of October 7 was also the culmination of the cynical exploitation by Arab and Israeli leaders of the Palestinian struggle for statehood. A year later, no one knows how to rebuild.
In the absence of a coherent and coordinated international response, Netanyahu and Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader and key architect of the October 7 attack, experience no repercussions as they continue on a destructive path, the conclusion of which is uncertain but one that will undoubtedly entail further loss of life.
Netanyahu has avoided genuine American initiatives aimed at normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia, arguably the most vital nation in the Arab and Islamic spheres, as the cost would entail a serious commitment to establishing a Palestinian state—the very goal he has dedicated his political career to obstructing.
Netanyahu’s motivation to prolong the conflict serves to deflect formal condemnation for the military and intelligence failures that led to the October 7 assault—a disaster that he is ultimately accountable for—and complicates any diplomatic endeavors. His desire to evade the personal allegations of fraud and corruption against him further complicates matters. He is engaged in a waiting strategy that now includes offering minimal or nothing until November 5, when Trump, whom he perceives as a strong ally, might be elected.
Families of Israeli soldiers sent into war are uncertain about how dedicated their commander in chief is to ensuring the safe return of those young service members by seizing any reasonable chances for peace. Many Israelis believe that this uncertainty is corrosive to the nation’s spirit.
As for Sinwar, the Israeli hostages in his custody provide him with leverage. His apparent disregard for the appalling loss of Palestinian lives in Gaza gives him significant influence over global opinion, which has increasingly turned against Israel as more Palestinian children fall victim.
To summarize, Sinwar has little incentive to alter his strategy; and, in what Stephen Heintz, the president of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, has termed “the age of turbulence,” the world is unlikely to alter that trajectory for him.
”The institutions that have shaped international relations and global issue resolution since the mid-20th century are evidently no longer capable of managing the challenges of the new millennium,” Heintz commented in a recent essay. “They are inefficient, ineffective, outdated, and, in certain instances, simply antiquated.”
This, too, has been a lesson learned during the year since the Hamas assault.
